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No. 83-529

· ''·c£e-~''-~ ~

UNITED STATES

Cert to CA4 (Ervin, Winter; Ru sell
[diss]) /1

~~~

v.

L

SHARPE and SAVAGE
distributors)
SUMMARY:

2-b

Timely

This case returns
to the Court following remand for
________...____

reconsideration in light of United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798
(1982).

The United States challenges the CA's holdings that (1) the

investigative detention of resps was unlawfully prolonged and (2) the
marijuana found in a pickup truck was a fruit of resps' unlawful
detention.

l

I

possession of marijuana with intent to distribute it, in violation of
'

21

u.s.c. §84l(a) (1).
On the morning of June 9, 1978,v6EA agent Cooke was on patrol in

an unmarked vehicle near

Su~set

Beach, North Carolina.

under surveillance for suspected drug trafficking.

The area was

At approimately

6:30a.m., the agent noticed a blue pickup, with an attached camper
shell, traveling on the highway in tandem with a blue Pontiac.

Resp

Savage was driving the pickup, and resp Sharpe was driving the
Pontiac.

Cooke noticed that the truck was riding low in the rear and

concluded that it was overloaded.

After following the two vehicles

for 21 miles, he decided to make an "investigative stop" and radioed
the State Highway Patrol for assistance.

Officer Thrasher responded

to the call, and the police, in separate vehicles, followed the
Pontiac and the pickup off the highway, through a campground, and back
I

onto the highway.
speed limit.
to stop.

At certain times, Sharpe and Savage

~ceeded

the

Once back on the highway, Thrasher signalled the Pontiac

As Sharpe moved the Pontiac into the right lane, the pickup

y/truck cut between the Pontiac and Thrasher's patrol car, nearly
hitting the patrol car, and continued down the highway.
Cooke stayed with the Pontiac.

At the agent's request, Sharpe

produced a Georgia driver's license, bearing the name of Raymond
Pavlovich.

After~ng

unable to make radio contact with Thrasher,

Cooke radioed local police to hold Sharpe while he went after Thrasher
and the pickup.

Until Cooke returned, Sharpe was held for 30-40

minutes.
Meanwhile, Thrasher chased and stopped Savage about one-half mile
down the road.

After patting him down, the officer asked Savage for a

driver's license.

Savage produced his own Florida driver's license

told Savage that he was not free to leave and could be held on
speeding charges.

I

Agent Cooke arrived approximately 15-20 minutes

later and sought permission to search the truck.

When Savage denied

permission, the officer stepped on the rear of the truck and, noting

...

that it did not move, confirmed his suspicion that it was heavily
loaded.

He then put his nose against the rear window (which was

~~

~~
- -·--- marijuan~
-

covered by a curtain) and reported that he could smell

agent took the truck keys out of the ignition, opened the rear of the
camper and observed several large burlap-wrapped bales.

Cooke

arrested Savage and returned to Sharpe and arrested him.
Later DEA agents took the truck to the Federal Building in
Charleston, South Carolina.

,,

Cooke ordered the bales removed, and

'' without a search warrant had eight randomly selected bales "sampled."

----

Chemical tests showed that the baled substance was marijuana.
The DC denied resps' motions to suppress the contraband.

I

divided CA reversed resps' convictions.

A

The majority assumed that

Cooke "had an articulable and reasonable suspicion that [resps] were
engaged in marijuana trafficking when he and Thrasher stopped the
Pontiac and the truck."

But the court held the investigative stops of

resps unlawful because they "failed to meet the requirement of
brevity" thought to govern such detention on less than probable cause.
In effect, the l~ngth of detention transformed the stops into de facto

I arrests without
.........

probable cause.

Consequently, the marijuana seized

......

from the truck should have been suppressed.
Alternatively, the majority held that the warrantless search of
the eight bales in government possession violated the Fourth

---

Amendment.
I

an investigatory stop invariably depended on the length of the
detention.

Instead, a reviewing court should look to the totality of

the circumstances justifying the detention.

Because the detention in

the present case was due not to the agent's actions, but to the
resps', the detention did not violate the Fourth Amendment.

Judge

Russell also concluded that the search of the bales did not violate
the Fourth Amendment.
The United States petitioned for cert., presenting three
questions for review: whether the investigative detention of resps was
unlawfully prolonged; whether the marijuana found in the pickup truck
was correctly found to be a fruit of any unlawful detention; and
whether the warrantless search of the bales was itself unlawful.

This

Court granted the petn, vacated the judgment of the CA, and remanded
the case for consideration in light of the intervening decision in
United States

v.~ss,

456

u.s.

798 (1982).

Justice Stevens, joined

by Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented on the ground that the
"issue in this case is whether a warrantelss search was itself
legitimate ...•

Our opinion in United States v. Ross sheds no light on

the proper disposition of the case
On remand, a

d ~ided

"

CA again reversed the convictions.

The

~

majority concluded that, in light

of Ross, it was required to

"disavow" its alternative holding disapproving the warrantless search
of the marijuana bales.

But "[f]indig that Ross does not adversely

affect our primary holding that the initial stop of the vehicle and
the lengthy detention of the two defendants constituted illegal
seizures," the court readopted the prior opinion as modified.

The

majority declined to reconsider its "principal holding or to reargue
i

the same issues that were addressed in detail in the original majority

Court's mandate.
Judge Russell again dissented.

i

Joined by Judges Widener, Hall

and Chapman, he also dissented from denial of rehearing of an en bane
hearing.

In his view this Court's remand required the court to

reconsider its conclusion that the detention of resps was unlawfully
prolonged.

Addressing the issue, he urged that the court's adherence

to its prior decision was inconsistent with Michigan v. Summers, 452
U.S. 692 (1981), and improperly failed to take into account resps'
responsibility for the circumstances that prolonged their detention.
CONTENTIONS:

~ecision

The Government maintains once again that the

below is inconsistent with Michigan v. Summers, 452

u.s.

692,

700-701 (1981) , in which the Court noted that the "exception for
limited intrusions that may be justified by special law enforcement
interests is not confined to the momentary, on-the-street detention

I

accompanied by a frisk for weapons
~

Therefore, in order to decide

whether this case is controlled by the general rule, it is necessary
to examine both the character of the official intrusion and its
justification."

Moreover, "[i]f the purpose underlying a Terry stop

-- investigating possible criminal activity -- is to be served, the
police must under certain circumstances be able to detain the
individual for longer than the brief time period involved in Terry
[ v. Ohio, 392
(1972)]."

u.s.

1 (1968)], and Adams [v. Williams, 407

Id. at 700 n. 12.

u.s.

143

In Summers, the Court upheld the

detention of the occupants of a house while the police executed a
search warrant for the house.

The Court's recent decision in United

y/ States v. Place, No. 81-1617 (June 20, 1983), reaffirms the principles
enunciated in Summers.

Although the Court held that "on the facts

presented" the 90-minute investigative detention in Place was unduly

longer than the momentary ones involved in Terry, Adams, and [United
States v.] Brignoni-Ponce [422

u.s.

873 (1975)]".

While the Court

recognized that "the brevity of the invasion of the individual's
Fourth Amendment interests is an important factor in determining

.·

whether the seizure is so minimally intrusive as to be justifiable on
reasonable suspicion," the Court "decline[d] to adopt any outside time
limitation for a permissible Terry stop."

Similarly, Circuit courts

have upheld brief, but longer than momentary, detentions of suspects
while they pursue their investigation.

See, e.g., United States v.

Short, 570 F.2d 1051, 1054-1055 (CADC 1978)

(holding it permissible

for police to detain a burglary suspect, whom they lacked probable
cause to arrest, for purpose of transporting the suspect to the scene
of the burglary for possible identification by the victim): United
States v. O'Looney, 544 F.2d 385, 389 (CA9)

(permitting police to

detain a person suspected of smuggling firearms for the period
necessary to obtain the presence of a law enforcement officer with
specific expertise in conducting investigations of such offenses),

u.s.

cert. denied, 429

1023 (1976).

The decision of the CA conflicts

with the teaching of this Court and the other CAs.
Even if the CA were correct in concluding that the duration of
the detentions rerdered the
~<::: _

seizure ~ f

resps' unreasonable under the

\

Fourth Amendment, it erred in holding that the marijuana discovered in
Savage's pickup truck was a suppressible fuit of the improper duration
of the detention.

In this case, the discovery of the marijuana in the

pickup did not in any meaningful way result from the fact that resps'
detentions were extended beyond a couple of minutes.
In a letter to Al Stevas, response has been waived.
I

The letter

states that since the Court remanded only for reconsideration in light

~.

j

.

with the "law of the case" doctrine.

The letter also suggests that

the government did not raise the fruits question in the court below
and should not be able to present it for the first time in this Court.
DISCUSSION:

..

While Summers is not directly on point, the

reasoning in that case suggests that a suspect may be detained briefly
while police pursue a legitimate investigation.

In the present case,

Sharpe's 30-40 minute detention was necessary to find out what
happened to Savage.

And Savage's 15-20 minute detention was necessary

to allow the DEA agent, who presumably had expertise in detecting the
presence of drugs, to arrive for and pursue his investigation of the
truck.

The CA reasoned that "the length of the detentions effectively
----~-1

transformed them into ~e facto arrests."

But if the two vehicles had

~

stopped together as apparently requested, only a short {1-2 minute)
and certainly permissible delay would have occurred.
I

The longer

delays by the law enforcement officers were "graduate[d] ... responses
to the demands of [the] particular situation," United States v. Place,
supra, slip op. at 13 n. 10, and in my view satisfied the Fourth
Amendment's standard of reasonableness.

The CA's fruits analysis also

seems questionable, but it is unclear that the government raised the
issue below.

It would be necessary to call for the record to decide

whether the issue were certworthy.
v/ I recommend CFR with an view toward granting and possibly
reversing summarily.
seem appropriate.

A GVR in light of Summers and Place does not

This Court already GVRed once previously, and

although this Court's order directed the CA to reconsider its opinion
in light of Ross, implicit in that order was an invitation to
reconsider, if not withdraw, the alternative ground raised for a
second time here.

As Judge Russell noted, three Justices dissented

...
,

address this alternative ground.
demonstrated by their disposi

The majority did not agree and

on that they did not feel that the

alternative ground now befo e the Court provided any basis for
reversing the convictio
••

If that is a correct reading of the

Court's order, summary reversal after a CFR would be appropriate.
Response has been waived •

..

I

I

November 15, 1983

Lieb

Op'ns in pet'n

No. 83-529 United States v. Sharpe
I believe you called for a response in this case.

..

response is now in.

The

It argues that consideration of the

lawfulness of the prolonged detention is foreclosed by the fact
that this Court remanded for reconsideration in light of Ross.

~oss did not affect that holding and "it is improbable that this
Court granted certiorari ••• and disapproved of the Fourth
Circuit's handling of the Terry issue through a silent and
implicit reprimand."

It is true that the Court's instructions on

remand suggested that only one of two alternative
to be examined.

ho~dings

needed

But that would be a rather senseless reading.

In any case, the Court granted cert. on all questions presented
by the Gov't and vacated the entire opinion.
~

So technically

consideration of the question now presented is not barred by law
of the case.
In addition to several other arguments that are not
particularly important, resps argue that CA4 did not reach
several arguments which might provide the basis for reversal no
matter what happens to the question presented now.

In

particular, the court did not reach the question of whether there
was particularized suspicion under Terry for the initial stop,
and in fact expressed skepticism about the government's
destruction of the evidence without permission of the DC.
RECOMMENDATION:

Nothing in the response changes anything.

On further reflection, it seems like this is just an

applicati~

of the 4th Amendment's reasonableness criteria to the facts of
this case.

CA4 simply found that the detention was longer

reasonably necessary.

That might have been wrong, but the

question does not seem to warrant this Court's even
nttPntion .

'l
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
UNITED STATES v. WILLIAM HARRIS SHARPE AND
DONALD DAVIS SAVAGE
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 83-529. Decided May-, 1984
PER CURIAM.
On the morning of June 9, 1978, Agent Cooke of the Drug
Enforcement Administration was on patrol in an unmarked
vehicle near Sunset Beach, North Carolina, an area under
surveillance for suspected drug trafficking. At approximat~ly 6:30 a. m., Cooke noticed a blue pickup truck, with an
attached camper shell, traveling on the highway in tandem
with a blue Pontiac. Respondent Savage was driving the
pickup, and respondent Sharpe was driving the Pontiac.
Agent Cooke noticed that the truck was riding low in the rear
and concluded that it was overloaded. A quilted material
covered the rear window of the camper.
Agent Cooke was sufficiently concerned to follow the two
vehicles for 21 miles; he then decided to make an "investigative stop" and radioed the State Highway Patrol for assistance. Officer Thrasher in a marked patrol car responded to
the call, and both he and Agent Cooke, in separate vehicles,
followed the Pontiac and the pickup off the highway, through
a campground, and back onto the highway. At certain
times, the Pontiac and the pickup exceeded the speed limit.
Once back on the highway, Thrasher signalled the driver of
the Pontiac to stop. As Sharpe moved the Pontiac into the
right lane, the pickup truck cut between the Pontiac and
Thrasher's patrol car, nearly hitting the patrol car, and continued down the highway.
Agent Cooke stayed with the Pontiac, which had stopped
at the side of the road. At the agent's request, Sharpe produced a Georgia driver's license bearing the name of Ray-

2

;..
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mond Pavlovich. Mter being unable to make radio contact
with Thrasher, Cooke radioed local police to come and hold
Sharpe while he went after Thrasher and the pickup. The
local police arrived and held Sharpe for 30 to 40 minutes until
Cooke returned.
Meanwhile, Thrasher chased the pickup and stopped it
about one-half mile down the road. Mter patting down the
driver, Thrasher asked him for a driver's license. The
driver, Savage, produced his own Florida driver's license and
a bill of sale for the truck bearing the name Pavlovich.
Thrasher told Savage that he was not free to leave and could
be held on speeding charges. Agent Cooke arrived at the
scene approximately 15 minutes later and sought permission
to search the pickup. When Savage denied permission, ·
Cooke stepped on the rear of the truck and, noting that it had
not moved, confirmed his suspicion that it was probably overloaded. He then put his nose against the rear window,
which was covered by a curtain, and reported t~at he could
smell marihuana. The agent removed the keys from the ignition, opened the rear of the camper, and observed several
large burlap-wrapped bales. Cooke arrested Savage andreturned to arrest Sharpe.
Later DEA agents took the truck to the Federal Building
in Charleston, South Carolina. Cooke ordered the bales removed and, without a search warrant, had 8 randomly selected bales sampled. As suspected, chemical tests showed
that the baled substance was marihuana.
Sharpe and Savage were charged with possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance in violation of 21
U. S. C. § 841(a)(1) and 18 U. S. C. § 2. The United States
District Court for the District of South Carolina denied respondents' motion to suppress the contraband, and respondents were convicted.
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit r~ctions. 660 F. 2d 967 (1981). The

..
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majority assumed that Cooke "had an articulable and reasonable suspicion that Sharpe and Savage were engaged in mari- ·
juana trafficking when he and Thrasher stopped the Pontiac
and the truck." I d., at 970. But the 'COurt held the investigative stops unlawful because they "failed to meet the requirement of brevity" governing such detention on less than
probable cause. Ibid. Alternatively, the majority held that
the warrantless search of the bales in government possession
violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that
on either ground the marihuana should have been suppressed. Judge Russell dissented.
The Government petitioned for certiorari, asking this
Court to review both of the alternative grounds held by the
Court of Appeals to justify suppression. 1 We granted the
petition, vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and
remanded the case for consideration in light of the intervening decision in United States v. Ross, 456 U. S. 798 (1982).
457 u. s. 1127 (1982). 2
On remand, a divided
f the Court
reversed the convictions. 712 F. 2d 65 (1983). The majority concluded that, in light of Ross, it was required to "disavow" its alternative holding disapproving the warrantless
search of the marihuana bales. But, "[f]inding that Ross
does not adversely affect our primary holding that the initial
stop of the vehicle and the lengthy detention of the two defendants constituted illegal seizures," the court readopted
the prior opinion as modified. The majority declined to reconsider its "principal holding or to reargue the same issues
' The Government also asked this Court to review the Court of Appeals'
holding that the marihuana was a fruit of respondents' unlawful detention.
2
JUSTICE STEVENS, joined by JUSTICES BRENNAN and MARSHALL, dissented, stating:
''We held [in Ross] that the scope of a legitimate warrantless search of an
automobile is defined by the object of the search and the places in which
there is probable cause to believe that it may be found. The issue presented in this case is whether a warrantless search was itself legitimate."
Id., at 1128.

UNITED STATES v. SHARPE
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that were addressed in detail in the original majority and dissenting opinions," reasoning that its action complied with this
Court's mandate. The panel assumed that "(h]ad [this]
Court felt that a reversal was in order, it could and would
have said so." I d., at 65, n. 1.
Judge Russell again dissented. Joined by Judges Widener, Hall and Chapman, he also dissented from denial of en
bane hearing. In his view, this Court's remand required the
court to reconsider its conclusion that the detention of respondents was unlawfully prolonged. Addressing the issue,
he urged that the Court of Appeals' adherence to its prior decision was inconsistent with Michigan v. Summers, 452 U. S.
692 (1981), and improperly failed to take into account respondents~ responsibility for the circumstances that prolonged their detention. 712 F. 2d, at 67-69.
The rule is settled that if the decision below is correct, "it
must be affirmed, illfiough thelower court relied upon a .
wrong ground or gave a wrong reason." Helvering v.
Gowran, 302 U. S. 238, 245 (1937). Therefore, had we concluded that one ground for the decision below was infirm
under Ross but that the alternative ground at issue here adequately supported the judgment, we would simply have denied the petition for certiorari. Instead, we vacated the first
panel decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case
to that court. Our disp2sjt~n woul~av~b~n__eoinj;less if
we did not want,!he .Q_ou~f Appg_~to r con..siderJ!le meritso f the issues now before the Court. The Court of A eals
---.....-\__ has railed to onoro uran=ection. Implicit in our order was
. / the direction to recons1 er, 1 not withdraw, the Court of Appeals' alternative holding that the prolonged detention of the
respondents violated the Fourth Amendment. By refusing
to reconsider this alternative holding, the Court of Appeals
misapprehended and failed ~ o~r or~r.
The Fourth Amendment guarantees "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures. . .. " The

---- -----

f
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Amendment applies to investigatory stops such as the stops
of the vehicles here, United States v. Cortez, 449 U. S. 411,
417 (1981); Reid v. Georgia, 448 U. S. 438, 440 (1980); United
States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873, 878 (1975), and in
clear language, prohibits not all searches and seizures, but
only those that are unreasonable.
In determining the reasonableness of an investigatory
stop, the Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 20 (1968),
adopted a dual inquiry:
"whether the officer's action was justified at its inception, and whether it was reasonably related in scope to
the circumstances which justified the interference in the
first place."
The Court of Appeals assumed that the police had an articulable and reasonable suspicion that Sharpe and Savage were
engaged in marihuana trafficking when they attempted to
stop the Pontiac and the pickup. 660 F. 2d, at 970. The
court concluded, however, that the 30 to 40-minute stop of
Sharpe and the 15-minute stop of Savage "failed to meet the
[Fourth Amendment's] requirement of brevity." Ibid.
We need not decide whether the length of Sharpe's detention was unreasonable, because that detention was wholly unrelated to Agent Cooke's discovery of the marihuana; the
marihuana was in Savage's pickup, not in Sharpe's Pontiac.
At issue in this case is whether it was reasonable under the
circumstances facing Agent Cook and Officer Thrasher to detain Savage, whose vehicle contained the challenged evidence, for 15 minutes. We conclude that Savage's detention
clearly satisfied the Fourth Amendment's standard of
reasonableness.
We note at the outset that when the police stopped respondents they had a reasonable suspicion that respondents
were engaged in illegal activity. Agent Cooke had observed
the vehicles travelling in tandem for 21 miles in an area near
the coast known to be frequented by drug traffickers. The
pickup truck appeared to be heavily loaded and the windows

7

1

...
--.
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of the camper shell were covered. Both vehicles took evasive actions and started speeding when Officer Thrasher began following them in his marked vehicle. Based on these
facts, Agent Cooke did not act improperly in stopping respondents to ascertain whether the pickup contained drugs.
Nor was Savage's 15-minute detention unreasonable under
the circumstances of this case. Agent Cooke diligently pursued his investigation. During most of Savage's 15-minute
detention, Cooke was attempting to contact Thrasher and enlisting the help of the local policemen who remained with
Sharpe while Cooke left to locate Officer Thrasher and the
pickup. When Cooke reached Officer Thrasher and Savage,
he examined the pickup's bill of sale, requested permission to
search the truck, stepped on the rear bumper of the pickup
and, noting that the truck did not move, confirmed his suspicion that it was probably overloaded. Cooke then detected
the odor of marijuana.
Clearly this case does not involve any delay unnecessary to
the legitimate investigation of the law enforcement officers.
Respondents have presented no evidence that the law enforcement officers were dilatory in their investigation. The
delay in this case was almost entirely attributable to the evasive actions of Savage, who sought to elude the police as
Sharpe moved his Pontiac to the side of the road. Absent
such evasive conduct, only a short and' certainly permissible
delay would have taken place. The somewhat longer detention was simply a "graduate[d] ... response[] to the demands of [the] particular situation," United States v. Place,
- - U. S. - - , - - , n. 10 (1983), and thus satisfied the
Fourth Amendment's standard of reasonableness.
In arriving at a contrary conclusion, the Court of Appeals
assumed that our cases establish a rigid "brevity requirement" for investigatory stops based on less than probable
cause. 660 F. 2d, at 970. Our cases impose no such time
limitation on Terry stops. While 1t 1s cleartfiat "the brevity
of the mvas1on onhe 'individual's Fourth Amendment inter-
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ests is an important factor in determining whether the seizure is so minimally intrusive as to be justifiable on reasonable suspicion," United States v. Place,-- U. S., at--,
we have emphasized the need to consider the law enforcement purposes to be served by the stop as well as the time
needed reasonably to effectuate those purposes. I d., at
--;see United States v. Cortez, 449 U. S. 411, 417 (1981);
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S., at 20. · As we stated in Michigan v.
Summers, 452 U. S. 692, 700, n. 12 (1981), "[i]f the purpose
underlying a Terry stop-investigating possible criminal activity-is to be served, the police must under certain circumstances be able to detain the individual for longer than the
brief time period involved in Terry and Adams [v. Williams,
407 U. S. 143 (1972)]." Where the police have acted diligently and the suspects are entirely responsible for the added
delay about which they complain, we decline to hold that a 15minute stop is unreasonable.
.
Because it was lawful to detain Savage for the 15 minutes
necessary for Agent Cooke to -complete his investigation, the
District Court properly denied respondents' motion to suppress the contraband seized from Savage's vehicle. Accordingly, the petition for certiorari should be granted, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case should
again be remanded for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
It is so ordered.
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appreciate your making the modest word changes on page 4 as
indicated in red on the enclosed copy of that page.
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Present language implies <1eJiherate conduct.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
LFP/vde

<.

4

,1"

\

1
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that were addressed in detail in the original majority and dissenting opinions," reasoning that its action complied with this
Court's mandate. !The panel assumed that "[h]ad [this]
Court felt that a reversal was in order, it could and would
have said so." !d., at 65, n. 1.
Judge Russell again dissented. Joined by Judges Widener, Hall and Chapman, he also dissented from denial of en
bane hearl.ng. In his view, this Court's remand required the
court to reconsider its conclusion that the detention of respondents was unlawfully prolonged. Addressing the issue,
he urged that the Court of Appeals' adherence to its prior decision was inconsistent with Michigan v. Summers, 452 U. S. '
692 (1981), and improperly failed to take into account respondents' responsibility for the circumstances that prolonged their detention. 712 F. 2d, at 67-69.
The rule is settled that if the decision below is correct, "it
must be ai'firnied~ alth-ough- the-l~vV-~r 'Court -~elied- upon a"
wrong g!"-oun'd or gave a wrong reason." Helvering v.
Gowran, 302 U. S. 238, 245 (1937). Therefore, had we con- ·
eluded that one ground for the decision below was infirm
under Ross but that the alternative ground at issue here adequately supported the judgment, we would simply have denied the petition for certiorari. Instead, we vacated the first
panel decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case
to that court. Our disposition would have been pointless if (
we did not want _the Court or'App.eals to reconsider the mer- i
its of the issues now before the Court. The Court of Ap_peals !
hae-Jall9d -t9 H.eN"En· our direction. Implicit in oilrord.e r was
theorrectiOntoreconSider; ·unot withdraw, the Court of Appeals' alternative holding that the prolonged detention of the
respondents violated the Fourth Amendment. By refusing '
to reconsider this alternative holding, the Court of Appeals
·
·
our earlier order.
--1\
The Fourth Amendment guarantees "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures. . .. " The
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
UNITED STATES v. WILLIAM HARRIS SHARPE AND
DONALD DAVIS SAVAGE
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 83-529. Decided May-, 1984
PER CURIAM.
On the morning of June 9, 1978, Agent Cooke of the Drug
Enforcement Administration was on patrol in an unmarked
vehicle near Sunset Beach, North Carolina, an area under
surveillance for suspected drug trafficking. At approximately 6:30 a. m., Cooke noticed a blue pickup truck, with an
attached camper shell, traveling on the highway in tandem
with a blue Pontiac. Respondent Savage was driving the
pickup, and respondent Sharpe was driving tile Pontiac.
Agent Cooke noticed that the truck was riding low in the rear
and concluded that it was overloaded. A quilted material
covered the rear window of the camper.
Agent Cooke was sufficiently concerned to follow the two
vehicles for 21 miles; he then decided to make an "investigative stop" and radioed the State Highway Patrol for assistance. Officer Thrasher in a marked patrol car responded to
the call, and both he and Agent Cooke, in separate vehicles,
followed the Pontiac and the pickup off the highway, through
a campground, and back onto the highway. At certain
times, the Pontiac and the pickup exceeded the speed limit.
Once back on the highway, Thrasher signalled the driver of
the Pontiac to stop. As Sharpe moved the Pontiac into the
right lane, the pickup truck cut between the Pontiac and
Thrasher's patrol car, nearly hitting the _patrol car, and continued down the highway.
Agent Cooke stayed with the Pontiac, which had stopped
at the side of the road. At the agent's request, Sharpe produced a Georgia driver's license bearing the name of Ray-

~of- s1~
k.;t- ~ ~

f!,·s /a"\i~ar~1~ d
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mond Pavlovich. After being unable to make radio contact
with Thrasher, Cooke radioed local police to come and hold
Sharpe while he went after Thrasher and the pickup. The
local police arrived and held Sharpe for 30 to 40 minutes until
Cooke returned.
Meanwhile, Thrasher chased the pickup and stopped it
about one-half mile down the road. After patting down the
driver, Thrasher asked him for a driver's license. The
driver, Savage, produced his own Florida driver's license and
a bill of sale for the truck bearing the name Pavlovich.
Thrasher told Savage that he was not free to leave and could
be held on speeding charges. Agent Cooke arrived at the
scene approximately 15 minutes later and sought permission
to search the pickup. When Savage denied permission,
Cooke stepped on the rear of the truck and, noting that it had
not moved, confirmed his suspicion that it was probably overloaded. He then put his nose against the rear window,
which was covered by a curtain, and reported that he could
smell marihuana. The agent removed the keys from the ignition, opened the rear of the camper, and observed several
large burlap-wrapped bales. Cooke arrested Savage and returned to arrest Sharpe.
Later DEA agents took the truck to the Federal Building
in Charleston, South Carolina. Cooke ordered the bales removed and, without a search warrant, had 8 randomly selected bales sampled. As suspected, chemical tests showed
that the baled substance was marihuana.
Sharpe and Savage were charged with possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance in violation of 21
U. S. C. § 841(a)(1) and 18 U. S. C. § 2. The United States
District Court for the District of South Carolina denied respondents' motion to suppress the contraband, and respondents were convicted.
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the convictions. 660 F. 2d 967 (1981). The
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majority assumed that Cooke "had an articulable and reasonable suspicion that Sharpe and Savage wereengaged- in marijuanatraificK:irig when he and Thrasher stopped the Pontiac
and the truck." I d., at 970. But the court held the investigative stops unlawful because they "failed to meet the requirement of brevity" governing such detention on less than
probable cause. Ibid. Alternatively, the majority held that
the warrantless search of the bales in government possession
violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that
on either ground the marihuana should have been suppressed. Judge Russell dissented.
The Government petitioned for certiorari, asking this
Court to review both of the alternative grounds held by the
Court of Appeals to justify suppression. 1 We granted the
petition, vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and
remanded the case for consideration in light of the intervening decision in United States v. Ross, 456 U. S. 798 (1982).
457 u. s. 1127 (1982). ~
On remand, a divided panel of the Court of Appeals again
reversed the convictions. 712 F. 2d 65 (1983). The majority concluded that, in light of Ross, it was required to "disavow" its alternative holding disapproving the warrantless
search of the marihuana bales. But, "[f]inding that Ross
does not adversely affect our primary holding that the initial
stop of the vehicle and the lengthy detention of the two defendants constituted illegal seizures," the court readopted
the prior opinion as modified. The majority declined to reconsider its "principal holding or to reargue the same issues
'The Government also asked this Court to review the Court of Appeals'
holding that the marihuana was a fruit of respondents' unlawful detention.
2
JUSTICE STEVENS, joined by JUSTICES BRENNAN and MARSHALL, dissented, stating:
"We held [in Ross] that the scope of a legitimate warrantless search of an
automobile is defined by the object of the search and the places in which
there is probable cause to believe that it may be found. The issue presented in this case is whether a warrantless search was itself legitimate."
I d., at 1128.
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that were addressed in detail in the original majority and dis. senting opinions," reasoning that its action complied with this
Court's mandate. The panel assumed that "[h]ad [this]
Court felt that a reversal was in order, it could and would
have said so." I d., at 65, n. 1.
Judge Russell again dissented. Joined by Judges Widener, Hall and Chapman, he also dissented from denial of en
bane hearing. In his view, this Court's remand required the
court to reconsider its conclusion that the detention of respondents was unlawfully prolonged. Addressing the issue,
he urged that the Court of Appeals' adherence to its prior decision was inconsistent with Michigan v. Summers, 452 U. S.
692 (1981), and improperly failed to take into account respondents' responsibility for the circumstances that prolonged their detention. 712 F. 2d, at 67--69.
The rule is settled that if the decision below is correct, "it
must be affirmed, although the lower court relied upon a
wrong ground or gave a wrong reason." H elvering v.
Gowran, 302 U. S. 238, 245 (1937). Therefore, had we concluded that one ground for the decision below was infirm
under Ross but that the alternative ground at issue here adequately supported the judgment, we would simply have denied the petition for certiorari. Instead, we vacated the first
panel decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case
to that court. Our disposition would have been pointless if
we did not want the Court of Appeals to reconsider the merits of the issues now before the Court. The Court of Appeals
clearly misread our direction. Implicit in our order was the I
direction to reconsider, if not withdraw, the Court of Appeals' alternative holding that the prolonged detention of the
respondents violated the Fourth Amendment. By declining
to reconsider this alternative holding, the Court of Appeals
failed to com ly with our earlier order.
he Fourth mendment guaran ees "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures. . .. " The
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Amendment applies to investi~ such as the stops
of the vehicles here, Uni:fi(TStates V. Cortez, 449 U. S. 411,
417 (1981); Reid v. Georgia, 448 U. S. 438, 440 (1980); United
States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873, 878 (1975), and in
clear language, prohibits not all searches and seizures, but
only those that are unreasonable.
In determining the reasonableness of an investigatory
stop, the Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 20 (1968),
adopted a dual inquiry:
"whether the officer's action was justified at its inception, and whether it was reasonably related in scope to
the circumstances which justified the interference in the
first place."
The Court of Appeals assumed that the police had an articulable and reasonable suspicion that Sharpe and Savage were
engaged in marihuana trafficking when they attempted to
stop the Pontiac and the pickup. 660 F. 2d, at 970. The
court concluded, however, that the 30 to 40-minute stop of
Sharpe and the 15-minute stop of Savage "failed to meet the
[Fourth Amendment's] requirement of brevity." Ibid.
We need not decide whether the length of Sharpe's detention was unreasonable, because that detention was wholly unrelated to Agent Cooke's discovery~ of the mari~ana; llie
marihuana was in Savage's pickup, not in Sharpe's Pontiac.
At issue in this case is whether it was reasonable under the
circumstances facing Agent Cook and Officer Thrasher to detain Savage, whose vehicle contained the challenged evidence, for 15 minutes. We conclude that Savage's detention
clearly satisfied the Fourth Amendment's standard of reasonableness.
We note at the outset that when the police stopped respondents they had a reasonable suspicion that respondents
were engaged in illeg~ooke had observed
the vehicles travelling in tandem for 21 miles in an area near
the coast known to be frequented by drug traffickers. The
pickup truck appeared to be heavily loaded and the windows

6
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of the camper shell were covered. Both vehicles took evasive actions and started speeding when Officer Thrasher began following them in his marked vehicle. Based on these
facts, Agent Cooke did not act improperly in stopping respondents to ascertain whether the pickup contained drugs.
Nor was Savage's 15-minute detention unreasonable under
the circumstances of this case. Agent Cooke diligently pursued his investigation. During most of Savage's 15-minute
detention, Cooke was attempting to contact Thrasher and enlisting the help of the local policemen who remained with
Sharpe while Cooke left to locate Officer Thrasher and the
pickup. When Cooke reached Officer Thrasher and Savage,
he examined the pickup's bill of sale, requested permission to
search the truck, stepped on the rear bumper of the pickup
and, noting that the truck did not move, confirmed his suspicion that it was probably overloaded. Cooke then detected
the odor of marijuana.
/~ Clearly this case does not involve any delay unnecessary to
{j the legitimate investigation of the law enforcement officers.
Respondents have presented no evidence that the law enforcement officers were dilatory in their investigation. The
delay in this case was almost entirely attributable to the evasive actions of Savage, who sought to elude the police as
Sharpe moved his Pontiac to the side of the road. Absent
such evasive conduct, only a short and certainly permissible
delay would have taken place. The somewhat longer detention was simply a "graduate[d] . . . response[] to the demands of [the] particular situation," United States v. Place,
--U.S. - - , - - , n. 10 (1983), and thus satisfied the
Fourth Amendment's standard of reasonableness.
In arriving at a contrary conclusion, the Court of Appeals
assumed that our cases establish a rigid "brevity requirement" for investigatory stops based on less than probable
cause. 660 F. 2d, at 970. Our cases impose no such time
limitation on Terry stops. While it is clear that "the brevity
of the invasion of the individual's Fourth Amendment inter-
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ests is an important factor in determining whether the seizure is so minimally intrusive as to be justifiable on reasonable suspicion," United States v. Place,-- U. S., at--,
we have emphasized the need to consider the law enforcement purposes to be served by the stop as well as the time
needed reasonably to effectuate those purposes. I d., at
- - ; see United States v. Cortez, 449 U. S. 411, 417 (1981);
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S., at 20. As we stated in Michigan v.
Summers , 452 U. S. 692, 700, n. 12 (1981), "[i]f the purpose
underlying a Terry stop-investigating possible criminal activity-is to be served, the police must under certain circumstances be able to detain the individual for longer than the
brief time period involved in Terry and Adams [v. Williams,
407 U. S. 143 (1972)]." Where the police have acted diligently and the suspects are entirely responsible for the added
delay about which they complain, we decline to hold that a 15minute stop is unreasonable.
·
Because it was lawful to detain Savage for the 15 minutes
necessary for Agent Cooke to complete his investigation, the
District Court properly denied respondents' motion to suppress the contraband seized from Savage's vehicle. Accordingly, the petition for certiorari is granted, the judgment of
the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.
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Motion of Respondents for}
L/
Leave to Proceed Further
~1
In Forma Pauperis
/'-

UNITED STATES

v.

Also Motion of
Respondents for Appointment of Counsel

SHARPE, et al.
SUMMARY:

Resps are ~gitives from justice and their

-- -

attorney is unable to contact them.

Through motions to proceed

ifp and for appointment of counsel, the attorney seeks to alert
the Court to the situation.
BACKGROUND:

Resps were convicted of possession of

marijuana with intent to distribute.

21 U.S.C. §84l(a)(l).

They appealed their conviction, asserting the DC erred by
failing to suppress contraband found in their possession.

~ overturned resps' conviction, finding:

The

(a) the

investigative detention of resps was unlawfully prolonged;
{b) the contraband was the fruit of the unlawful detention; and
/

(c) a later, more thorough warrantless search of resps' car was

illegal.

The~ited

States petitioned the Court for review of

the CA 4's decision.
In 1983, the Court granted cert and remanded the case to
the CA 4 for reconsideration in light of the Court's recent

~----------------------------~-----------------------------decision
regarding warrantless searches (United States v. Ross,
456

u.s.

798 (1982)).

On remand, the CA 4 "disavowed" those

..

'

portions of its previous decision on the warrantless search of
resps' car which conflicted with Ross, but reaffirmed its
holding based on the illegality of the initial investigative
stop and resps' prolonged detention.
readopted its_g revious

--

The circuit court

OJ2in ~~

form and again

~

reversed resps' conviction.

/

'

The government petitioned for cert a second time.

On

June 18, 1984, the Court granted the petition.
' ·~------------------On May 11, 1984,
while the petn for cert was pending,
counsel for resps informed the Clerk that Sharpe had failed to
appear in the DC for a previously scheduled bail review
hearing.
appear.

In July 1984, the other resp, Savage, also failed to
The DC issued bench warrants for resps.

------------------

In failing to

appear, resps each forfeited a $50,000 bond and $10,000 on
deposit with the DC clerk.
CONTENTIONS:
difficult position.

JL

0

Resps' disappearance places counsel in a
He may have an ethical duty to

proceed--even without his clients.

However, the attorney states

he does not know the whereabouts of resps and cannot consult
with his clients concerning their appeal.
On August 27, 1984, resps' counsel filed a motion to
proceed ifp and for appointment of counsel.

He explains he is

willing to prepare and argue the case, but would like to at
least be reimbursed for expenses (i.e., copying costs and air

fare).~unsel

was not appointed below and no affidavit of

financial need has been filed in support of the motion.

Counsel

requests the Court waive the requirement for such a document in
this case.
DISCUSSION:

Generally, resps' [fugitive statll1 would

"disentitle them from calling upon the resources of the Court."
(Molinaro v. New Jersey, 396 U.S. 365, 366 (1970).)

However, in

this case, the government has petitioned for cert and an order
denying the counsel's call for help may undermine the Court's
efforts to dispose of the case.

There are several alternatives

which may be considered depending on whether the Court feels the
assistance of counsel will enhance its treatment of the issues.
A.

Summary . Disposition.

The Court may wish to

consider summary disposition in this case.

The issues raised by

the government were before the Court in the previous
proceeding.

At this time, the Court has received the petn for

cert, resps' opposition, a reply memorandum and the government's
opening brief.

It may be that the issues are adequately

developed by these filings and additional briefing and/or
argument would not add to the Court's understanding and
treatment of the case.l

Under these circumstances, the

appointment of appellate counsel to prepare and argue resps'
position may be unnecessary and the motion could be denied.
1If the Court is interested in this alternative, it may
wish to instruct the Legal Office to prepare a memorandum
addressing the merits of the petn.

I

I

B.

Amicus Counsel.

If the Court feels it would

benefit from further briefing of the issues, it may consider
appointing amicus counsel to support the circuit court's
position.

Resps' counsel, who is already familiar with the

case, would be a logical choice.

However, the Court need not

appoint the party's attorney--it could appoint some other
advocate to support the CA 4's decision.

Appointment of new

counsel would minimize the appearance resps are benefiting from
their fugitive status.
The attorney appointed amicus would donate his or her time
pro bono, but the Court could compensate counsel for expenses
(i.e., approximately $900.00 for copying the brief and travel to
Washington, D.C.).

A disadvantage of this approach is that the

Court may not be able to recover these costs from resps if and
when they are

1

l

C.

located~

Conditional IFP.

Finally, the Court may wish to

consider granting counsel's request for ifp status and an
appointment under the

C~A.on

the condition that the costs be

taxed against resps (if they are located and found to have
sufficient assets).
counsel's assistance.

This would give the Court the benefit of
\

However, it would also permit resps

access to the resources of the Court despite their fugitive
status.
CONCLUSION:

The fugitive status of the criminal-defendant

---------------

resps raises a unique problem.

The Court could consider the

petn summarily, appoint amicus counsel or conditionally appoint
resps' counsel.

I recommend that tl1e Court consider summary

disposition, as this approach does not preclude the other

alternatives.

A careful consideration of summary treatment

should reveal the need, if it exists, for further briefs and
argument.
No response has been received.
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United States v. Sharpe and Savage(CA4)

MEMO TO FILE
This is another case involving "reasonable suspicion
to stop and questions persons believed to be engaged in
criminal conduct".
below

and

the

The facts are detailed in the opinions

briefs

of

the

par ties.

In

summary,

the

facts are as follows:
DEA
matters,

Agent

Cooke,

experienced

was on patrol

in

drug

enforcement

in an unmarked car on a coastal

road in the vicinity of Sunset Beach, North Carolina, an
area under surveillance by law enforcement authorities for
suspected drug trafficing.
with

a

"camper

shell"

Cooke followed a pickup truck

traveling

together

with

a

blue

pontiac.

Cooke observed that the truck was riding low in

the

(apparently overloaded) ,

rear

and

its rear and side

windows covered from the inside with a quilt material, and
also

that

it

had

taken

evasive

action

by

leaving

the

highway and then returning.
Cooke summoned assistance by radio to which Officer
Thrasher,

in a marked patrol car, responded.

Respondents

in a speed limit zone of 35 miles per hour, attempted to

elude the officers -

first made a "fruitless detour" off

of the 6-lane highway,
hour

before Officer

stop.

Savage

in

and then drove 50 to 60 miles an

Thrasher

the

signalled both vehicles to

pickup

truck,

drove

between

the

pontiac and Officer Thrasher's patrol car nearly hitting
the latter, and failed to stop.
While Thrasher pursued the pickup truck, Agent Cooke
questioned Sharpe, the driver of the pontiac.

The pickup

truck was overtaken about a half a mile down the highway,
two

local

Sharpe

Mirtle

beside

Thrasher

and

questioning,
driver)

Beach

the

pontiac,

the
the

police

pickup
DEA

remained

and

Cooke

truck.

Agent

After

told

Savage

with

respondent

joined

Officer

unsatisfactory
(pickup

truck

that he was suspected of transporting marijuana,

requested

permission

declined.

The DEA Agent, noting that truck still appeared

to be overloaded,
camper

top

marijuana".

to

search

the

leaned against the

where

he

Cooke,

smelled
with

keys

"a

truck,

Savage

rear window of

very

left

but

in

strong
the

odor

the
of

vehicle's

ignition, opened the rear door of the camper and observed
a large number of burlap wrapped bags in which marijuana
is often transported.

Cooke then placed Sharpe and Savage

(the respondents) under arrest.

Later that day, after the

pickup

truck

Charleston,
removed

had
the

from

been taken
DEA

the

to the Federal Building

agents

truck

43

some
bales

three

days

weighing

in

later

2600

pounds.

Acting without a search warrant, the agent opened 8 bales
at

random

and

withdrew

samples

for

lab

analysis.

The

substance was marijuana.
The Decisions Below
The

DC

denied

marijuana.
reversed,
court}

The
with

-

respondents

Court

of

Russell

motion

Appeals

to

suppress

(Erwin

dissenting.

The

and

Winter}

majority

relying on Terry and Br ignoni Ponce

the

(the

(primarily}

held that the detention of respondents for some 30 to 40
minutes exceeded the scope of investigation permissible on
the basis of reasonable suspicion short of probable cause.
The Court

of

detentions

Appeals concluded

effectively

arrests without basis
detentions

that

transformed

"the length of
them

into

and probable cause",

therefore constituted

unlawful

de

the

facto

and that the

seizures under

the Fourth Amendment.
Judge
whether

Russell,

the

length

in dissent held
of

a

detention

that

in determining

renders

a

particular

stop unreasonable, courts must look to the totality of the
circumstances

justifying

the

detention.

Judge

Russell

observed

that

detention

was

any
not

delay

that

prolonged . respondents

attributable

to

the

law

enforcement

officers, but was occasioned primarily by the efforts of
Savage to avoid being stopped.
We

granted

judgment

of

the

CA4,

government

and

remanded

petition,

vacated

the

for

case

the

further

u.s.

consideration in light of the intervening decision in
v. Ross,

456

u.s.

798 (1982).

On remand, CA4

(2-1) again

reversed respondents convictions, concluding that in light
of Ross it was required to disavow its alternative holding
disapproving
bales.
does

the

But CA4
not

warrantless

search

also concluded

adversely

affect

that

our

of

the

"finding

primary

holding

marijuana
that

Ross

that

the

initial stop of the vehicle and the lengthy detention of
the

two

court

defendants

readopted

Russell

agains

majority's
inconsistent
(1918),

and

constituted

the

illegal

seizures",

prior

opinion

as

dissented,

arguing

primarily

adherence
with

to

Michigan

improperly

its
v.

failed

modified.

prior

take

Judge

that

decision

Summers,
to

the

452

u.s.

into account

the
was
692
the

fact that respondents were themselves responsible for the
circumstances that prolonged the detention.
The Parties Positions

The
SG • s

SG agrees essentially with Judge

statement of

the question

indicates

Russell.
rather

The

clearly

his position:
"The principal question presented by this
case concerns the permissiblity under the Fourth
Amendment of detaining a suspect for a limited,
but more than momentary, period on the basis of
reasonable suspicion falling short of probable
casue,
for
the
purpose
of
pursuing
a
circumscribed investigation of the suspected
criminal activity.
This question is of great
practical
importance
to
law
enforcement
authorities.
There are a wide variety of
situations in which it may be advisable, in the
course of a routine investigatory stop, for an
officer to detain a suspect beyond the minute or
two that, in the view of the court of appeals,
define the outer boundaries of a permissible
seizure on less than probable cause."
As examples of the needs of the police to have some
flexibility

under

the

circumstances,

the

SG

cited

the

situation where a suspect may be detained while the police
attempt to determine whether a crime has occurred in the
area or,

if a crime is known to have occurred, to enable

witnesses to view the suspect.

See Michigan v.

Summers.

The SG's brief distinguishes Terry, Adams v. Williams, and
Brignoni
those

cases

detention
the

Ponce,

is

although

were
not

quite

recognizing
brief.

But

that
the

necessarily controlling

circumstances.

The

SG

argues

the

stops

lenght
depending

that

the

of

in
a

upon

correct

approach

is

the

"standard of

reasonableness embodied

in

the Fourth Amendment", citing Summers:
"If the purpose underlying a Terry stop investigating possible criminal activity - is to
be
served,
the
police
must
under
certain
circumstances be able to detain the individual
for longer than the brief time period involved
in Terry and Adams."
Respondents
arrests

for

argue

up

to

that

40

they

were

under

They

minutes.

state

"de

facto"

the

issue

presented in simplicity terms:
"The

issue

presented

is

whether

the

investigatory

stop made pursuant to Terry v. Ohio was converted into an
unlawful
subsequent

arrest

by

actions

the
of

duration

the

of

officers.

the

stop

The

length

and

the

of

the

detentions "transformed them into de facto arrests without
basis and probable cause.

An essential element of a Terry

type stop is its brevity", citing Brignoni-Ponce and Adams
v. Williams.

***
My Comment
This
certainly

case presents an
true

that

in

interesting question.

our

prior

cases

we

have

emphasized

the

Yet,

in

none

of

prior

these

It

"investigative

brevity of
cases

was

the

is

stop"

detention.

there

a

law

enforcement
case,

for

need

comparable

to

that

presented

long detention of the suspects.

by

this

In Br ignoni-

Ponce for example, the stops were made at a highway check
point and only when there was suspicion of illegal aliens
in the vehicle was it pulled aside but

merely

for

brief

not for a search -

questioning.

Here,

although

the

detention extended over a substantial period of time
to

40

minutes),

efforts

of

much

the

of

this

respondents

was

to

(up

occasioned wholly

avoid

the

initial

by

stop.

Also the flight of Savage is significant.
Judge Russell makes a reasonable argument in saying
that

the

standard

detention

was

The

different

determining
traditional

be

"reasonable

circumstances".
somewhat

should

SG

arrest

under

the

supports

this

language.

whether

a
is

whether

His

seizure
permissible,

the

investigative

totality
view

of

although

brief

states

less

intrusive

"it

is

the

that

in
in

than

necessary

to

consider the reasonableness of the seizure in light of all
the

surrounding

circumstances".

The

SG

does

not

particularly emphasize Judge Russell's point that one of
important
Savage

and

circumstances
the

time

in

this

required

to

case was
overtake

the
him,

flight
and

of
for

Officer Cooke to join the state trooper who had caught up
and stopped Savage.
The case is certainly important for law enforcement.
I am inclined to reverse, but recognize the difficulty of
identifying

a

standard

that

would

not

require

factual

determinations in considerable detail in every case.

Yet,

a "bright line" or per se rule based only the duration of
the investigative stop hardly seems reasonable.
As I
case,

understand the issues, and am familiar with the

I do not need a bench memo.

A brief summary of my

clerk's view of how this case should be analyzed would be
welcome.
LFP, JR •
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TO: Justice Powell
EROM: Lee
ffi: No. 83-529, United States v. Sharpe, et al.

(C.A4-J

I agree with your tentative conclusion that the judgment
of CA4 should be reversed.

The court implied that investigatory

stops based on "reasonable suspicion" could never last longer
Judg~n

than a couple of minutes.

stated that he could not ~
I

think that CA4's analysis is flawed; under some circumstances,
mvestigatory stops lasting longer than a few minutes are
reasonable.
In Michigan v. Summer , 452

u.s.

693 (1981), the Court

held that a warrant to search for contraband founded on probable
cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to detain
I l

,--

an occupant of the premises while a proper search is conducted.
The Court held that this detention is reasonable even if the
police lack probable cause to arrest the occupant.

In reaching

its conclusion, the Court recognized that the exceptions to the
probable cause requriement were "not confined to the momentary,
on the street detention accompanied by a frisk for weapons
involved in Terry and Adams."

The Summers Court stated that in

deciding whether other exceptions were justified, it is

necessary ~~~

to examine both the character of the official intrusion and its
justification.

-

----7

/

In United States v. Place, 51 USLW 4844 (1983), the
Court again indicated that detentions lasting longer than a
moment were sometimes reasonable, even in the absence of probable
cause.

In that case, a suspected drug courier was held for 90

minutes so that his luggage could be sniffed by a specially
crained dog.
in that case.
~e

The Court held that the detention was unreasonable
The Court noted that the police officers knew that

suspect was going to be arriving on a particular flight:

therefore, they could have had the trained dogs waiting at the
airport, so as to minimize the length of the detention.

The

Court was careful to state, however, that it was not adopting any
"outside time limitation for a permissible Terry stop.

The

length of a detention certainly was a factor, but it was not
determinative.

-

~ummers and Place indicate that the CA erred in adopting
a per se rule.

The "totality of the circumstances" approach

.....__---.....

suggested by
such a test,

his dissent is preferable.

Under

the investigatory stop was reasonable.

DEA agent Cooke was by himself when he spotted the two suspicious
vehicles.

When he decided that it would be necessary to stop the

cruck and the Pontiac for brief questioning, he enlisted the aid
of a state trooper, Thrasher.

The law enforcement officers

intended to stop both vehicles in the same place, thereby
facilitating the questioning of the drivers.
cruck, however, decided not to pull over.

The driver of the

Therefore, while Cooke

remained with the driver of the car, Thrasher chased the truck
about one-half mile down the road.

~

Through no fault of the law enforcement officers, the
drivers of the two vehicles were separated by one-half mile.
~though Cooke probably wanted briefly to question the two

suspects together, that option was foreclosed by Sharp's evasive
action.

Agent Cooke then undertook to question briefly Sharpe,

the driver of the automobile.

No one contends that this initial

qJestioning of Sharpe was so long as to be unreasonable.

After

finishing with Sharpe, Agent Cooke could not leave the suspect
unattended while he went down the road to question Savage.
Therefore, he had to wait a few more minutes for reinforcements
from the local police department.

As soon as the reinforcements

arrived, Agent Cooke proceeded down the road for his second round

of questioning.

Once he reached the truck, Cooke questioned

Savage only briefly before it became clear that there was
marijuana was in the truck.

In summary, the actual questioning

of both suspects was brief, no longer than the questioning
permitted in cases such as Brignoni-Ponce.

The time of detention

was prolonged solely because one of the two suspects took evasive
action.
I think that the action taken by Agent Cooke was
reasonable.

The only way that the total detention time could

have been shortened would have been to transport one of the
suspects to the location of the other.

Arguably, this would have

involved a much greater intrusion than the one involved here.
Therefore, this case is unlike Place, where the officers were not
"diligent" in limiting the scope of the intrusion.

It is difficult to come up with a standard for
determining when reasonable suspicion may justify the detention
of a suspect for more than a few minutes.

The "totality of the

circumstances" test does not provide police officers with much
guidance.

Nevertheless, there are two factors that seem

especially relevant to the inquiry.

First, if the suspect is

detained where he is stopped, the seizure is less intrusive than
if he is transported somewhere else, particularly a police
station.

Second, the diligence of the police officer is

relevant.

The court should consider whether the policeman could

mve made the seizure less intrusive and still accomplish his
goals.

In this case, both of these factors suggest that the

search was reasonable.

Furthermore, here the law enforcement

officer wanted to question the suspects only briefly, but was
frustrated in that effort by the actions of the one of the
suspects.

Although this consideration has relatively limited

applicability outside of the facts of this case, it might be
dispositive here.
I recommend that the judgment of CA4 be reversed.
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[December-, 1984]
CHI

BURGER

delivered the opinion of the

_ Co

e granted certiorari to decide whether an individual rea~"'r sonably suspected of engaging in criminal activity may be detained for a period of 20 minutes, when the detention is nee~ ~. _,Jo-/
essary for law enforcement officers to conduct a limited
~{~
investigation of the suspected criminal activity.

lv

I
A
On the mo~ne 9, 1978, Agent Cooke of the Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA) was on patrol in an unmarked vehicle on a coastal road near Sunset Beach, North
Carolina, an area under surveillance for suspected drug trafficking. At approximately 6:30 a. m., Cooke noticed a blue
pickup truck with an attached camper shell traveling on the
highway in tandem with a blue Pontiac Bonneville. Respondent Savage was driving the pickup, and respondent
Sharpe was driving the Pontiac. The Pontiac also carried a
passenger, Davis, the charges against whom were later
dropped. Observing that the truck was riding low in the
rear and that the camper did not bounce or sway appreciably
when the truck drove over bumps or around curves, Agent
Cooke concluded that it was heavily loaded. A quilted material covered the rear and side windows of the camper.

T ~ ·W ~j~ 1t:.~ Of'~av, • .I !1/;A, -h:..J fi-.J
-h._ (J u~s u,J.<- /o ~4si1P -/J- fJ...- ck!l-.JJs' ~--,s
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Cooke's suspicions were sufficiently aroused to follow the
two vehicles for approximately 20 miles as they proceeded
south into South Carolina. He then decided to make an "investigative stop" and radioed the State Highway Patrol for
assistance. Officer Thrasher, driving a marked patrol car,
responded to the call. Almost immediately after Thrasher
caught up with the procession, the Pontiac and the pickup
turned off the highway and onto a campground road. Cooke
and Thrasher followed the two vehicles as the latter drove
along the road at 55 to 60 miles an hour, exceeding the speed
limit of 35 miles an hour. The road eventually looped back to
the highway, onto which Savage and Sharpe turned and continued to drive south.
At this point, all four vehicles were in the middle lane of
the three right-hand lanes of the highway. Agent Cooke
asked Officer Thrasher to signal both vehicles to stop.
· Thrasher pulled alongside the Pontiac, which was in the lead,
turned on his flashing light, and motioned for the driver of
the Pontiac to stop. As Sharpe moved the Pontiac into the
right lane, the pickup truck cut between the Pontiac and
Thrasher's patrol car, nearly hitting the patrol car, and continued down the highway. Thrasher pursued the truck
while Cooke pulled up behind the Pontiac.
Cooke approached the Pontiac and identified himself. He
requested identification, and Sharpe produced a Georgia
driver's license bearing the name of Raymond J. Pavlovich.
Cooke then attempted to radio Thrasher to determine
whether he had been successful in stopping the pickup truck,
but he was unable to make contact for several minutes, apparently because Thrasher was not in his patrol car. Cooke
radioed the local police for assistance, and two officers from
the Myrtle Beach Police Department arrived about 10 minutes later. Asking the two officers to "maintain the situation," Cooke left to join Thrasher.
In the meantime, Thrasher had stopped the pickup truck
about one-half mile down the road. After stopping the

83-529---0PINION
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truck, Thrasher had approached it with his revolver drawn,
ordered the driver, Savage, to get out and assume a "spread
eagled" position against the side of the truck, and patted him
down. Thrasher then holstered his gun and asked Savage
for his driver's license and the truck's vehicle registration.
Savage produced his own Florida driver's license and a bill of
sale for the truck bearing the name of Pavlovich. In response to questions from Thrasher concerning the ownership
of the truck, Savage said that the truck belonged to a friend
and that he was taking it to have its shock absorbers repaired. When Thrasher told Savage that he would be held
until the arrival of Cooke, whom Thrasher identified as a
DEA agent, Savage became nervous, said that he wanted to
leave, and requested the return of his driver's license.
Thrasher replied that Savage was not free to leave at that
time.
Agent Cooke arrived at the scene approximately 15 minutes after the truck had been stopped. Thrasher handed
Cooke Savage's license and the bill of sale for the truck;
Cooke noted that the bill of sale bore the same name as
Sharpe's license. Cooke identified himself to Savage as a
DEA agent and said that he thought the truck was loaded
with marihuana. Cooke twice sought permission to search
the camper, but Savage declined to give it, explaining that he
was not the owner of the truck. Cooke then stepped on the
rear of the truck and, observing that it did not sink any
lower, confirmed his suspicion that it was probably overloaded. He put his nose against the rear window, which was
covered from the inside, and reported that he could smell
marihuana. Without seeking Savage's permission, Cooke
removed the keys from the ignition, opened the rear of the
camper, and observed a large number of burlap-wrapped
bales resembling bales of marihuana that Cooke had seen in
previous investigations. Agent Cooke then placed Savage
under arrest and left him with Thrasher.
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Cooke returned to the Pontiac and arrested Sharpe and
Davis. Approximately 30 to 40 minutes had elapsed between the time Cooke stopped the Pontiac and the time he
returned to arrest Sharpe and Davis. Cooke assembled the
various parties and vehicles and led them to the Myrtle
Beach police station. That evening, DEA agents took the
truck to the Federal Building in Charleston, South Carolina.
Several days later, Cooke supervised the unloading of the
truck, which contained 43 bales weighing a total of 2629
pounds. Acting without a search warrant, Cooke had 8 randomly selected bales opened and sampled. Chemical tests
showed that the samples were marihuana.
B

Sharpe and Savage were charged with possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute it in violation of 21
U. S.C. §841(a)(1) (1982) and 18 U.S. C. §2 (1982). The
United States District Court for the District of South Carolina denied respondents' motion to suppress the contraband,
and respondents were convicted.
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the convictions. 660 F. 2d 967 (1981). The
majority assumed that Cooke "had an articulable and reasonable suspicion that Sharpe and Savage were engaged in marijuana trafficking when he and Thrasher stopped the Pontiac
and the truck." I d., at 970. But the court held the investigative stops unlawful because they "failed to meet the requirement of brevity" thought to govern detentions on less
than probable cause. Ibid. Basing its decision solely on the
duration of the respondents' detentions, the majority concluded that "the length of the detentions effectively transformed them into de facto arrests without bases in probable
cause, unreasonable seizures under the Fourth Amendment."
Ibid. The majority then determined that the samples of
marihuana should have been suppressed as the fruit of respondents' unlawful seizures. I d., at 971. As an alterna-

83-529-0PINION
UNITED STATES v. SHARPE

5

tive basis for its decision, the majority held that the warrantless search of the bales taken from the pickup violated
Robbins v. California, 453 U. S. 420 (1981). Judge Russell
dissented as to both grounds of the majority's decision.
The Government petitioned for certiorari, asking this
Court to review both of the alternative grounds held by the
Court of Appeals to justify suppression. We granted the petition, vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and remanded the case for further consideration in the light of the
intervening decision in United States v. Ross, 456 U. S. 798
(1982). 457 u. s. 1127 (1982).
On remand, a divided panel of the Court of Appeals again
reversed the convictions. 712 F. 2d 65 (1983). The majority concluded that, in the light of Ross, it was required to
"disavow" its alternative holding disapproving the warrantless search of the marihuana bales. But, "[f]inding that Ross
does not adversely affect our primary holding" that the detentions of the two defendants constituted illegal seizures,
the court readopted the prior opinion as modified. Ibid.
The majority declined "to reexamine our principal holding or
to reargue the same issues that were addressed in detail in
the original majority and dissenting opinions," reasoning that
its action complied with this Court's mandate. The panel assumed that "[h]ad [this] Court felt that a reversal was in
order, it could and would have said so." Id., at 65, n. 1.
Judge Russell again dissented.
We granted certiorari, - - U. S. - - (1984), and we
reverse. 1
We granted certiorari on June 18, 1984. On August 27, counsel for respondents notified the Court that respondents had become fugitives. · On
October 1, we directed counsel for respondents to file a brief as amicus curiae in support of affirmance of the Court of Appeals' judgment. Because
our reversal of the Court of Appeals' judgment may lead to the reinstatement of respondents' convictions, respondents' fugitive status does not render this case moot. See United States v. Villamonte-Marquez,- U. S.
- , - , n. 2 [103 S. Ct. 2573, 2576, n. 2] (1983); Molinaro v. New Jersey, 396 U. S. 365, 366 (1970) (per curiam) .
1

I
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II
As a threshold matter, we consider it important to note
that the Court of Appeals misread our remand. It is a settled rule of appellate review that, "if the decision below is
correct, it must be affirmed, although the lower court relied
upon a wrong ground or gave a wrong reason." Helvering v.
Gowran, 302 U. S. 238, 245 (1937). Had we concluded that
the alternative ground for the decision below was infirm
under Ross but that the primary ground adequately supported the judgment, there would have been no occasion for a
remand; we would simply have denied the petition for certiorari. Instead, we vacated the first panel decision of the
Court of Appeals and remanded the case to that court. That
disposition would have been pointless had we not contemplated that the Court of Appeals was to reconsider the merits
of the issue now before the Court. Implicit in our order was
the direction to reexamine, if not withdraw, the Court of Appeals' holding that the detentions of the respondents violated
the Fourth Amendment. In declining to reconsider this
holding, the Court of Appeals misperceived the thrust of our
remand.
III
A
The Fourth Amendment is not, of course, a guarantee
against all searches and seizures, but only against unreasonable searches and seizures; the Constitution does not require
the government to show that a challenged action was reasonable, but only that it was not unreasonable. The authority
and limits of the Amendment apply to investigative stops of
vehicles such as occurred here. United States v. Cortez, 449
U. S. 411, 417 (1981); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S. 648, 663
(1979); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873, 878,
880 (1975). In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968), we adopted
a dual inquiry for evaluating the reasonableness of an investigative stop. Under this approach, ?!e examine:

?
\

7
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"whether the officer's action was justified at its inception, and whether it was reasonably related in scope to
the circumstances which justified the interference in the
first place." I d., at 20.
As to the first part of this inquiry, the Court of Appeals
assumed that the police had an articulable and reasonable
suspicion that Sharpe and Savage were engaged in marihuana trafficking, given the setting and all the circumstances
when the police attempted to stop the Pontiac and the
pickup. 660 F. 2d, at 970. That assumption is abundantly
supported by the record. 2 As to the second part of the inquiry, however, the court concluded that the 30- to 40-minute
detention of Sharpe and the 20-minute detention of Savage
"failed to meet th~ourth-Amendment's] requirement of
brevity." Ibid.
It is not necessary for us to decide whether the length of
Sharpe's detention was unreasonable, because that detention
bears no causal relation to Agent Cooke's discovery of the
marihuana. The marihuana was in Savage's Rickup, not in
Sharpe's Pontiac; tile contraoand' ffitroduced at responaents'
trial canno£ lOi ·call be considered the "fruit" of Sharpe's detention.
he onl issue in this case then, is whether it was
reasonable un er t e circumstances facing Agent Cooke and
Officer Thrasher to detain Savage, whose vehicle contained
the challenged evidence, for approximately 20 minutes. We
' Agent Cooke had observed the vehicles traveling in tandem for 20
miles in an area near the coast known to be frequented by drug traffickers.
Cooke testified that pickup trucks with camper shells were often used to
transport large quantities of marihuana. App. 10. Savage's pickup truck
appeared to be heavily loaded, and the windows of the camper were· covered with a quilted bed-sheet material rather than curtains. Finally, both
vehicles took evasive actions and started speeding as soon as Officer
Thrasher began following them in his marked car. Perhaps none of these
facts, standing alone, would give rise to a reasonable suspicion; but taken
together as appraised by an experienced law enforcement officer, they provided clear justification to stop the vehicles and pursue a limited
investigation.
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conclude that the detention of Savage clearly meets the
Fourth Amendment's standard of reasonableness.
The Court of Appeals did not question the reasonableness
of Officer Thrasher's or Agent Cooke's conduct during their
detention of Savage. Rather, the court concluded that the
length of the detention alone transformed it from a Terry
stop into a de facto arrest. Counsel for respondents, as amicus curiae, assert that conclusion as their principal argument
before this Court, relying particularly upon our decisions in
Dunaway v. New York, 442 U. S. 200 (1979); Florida v.
Royer, U. S. [103 S. Ct. 1319] (1983); and United
U. S. [103 S. Ct. 2637] (1983).
States v, Place, That reliance is misplaced.
In Dunaway, the police picked up a murder suspect from a
neighbor's home and brought him to the police station,
where, after being interrogated for an hour, he confessed.
The state conceded that the police lacked probable cause
when they picked up the suspect, but sought to justify the
warrantless detention and interrogation as an investigative
stop. The Court rejected this argument, concluding that the
defendant's detention was "in important respects indistinguishable from a traditional arrest." 442 U. S., at 212.
Dunaway is simply inapposite here: the Court was not concerned with the length of the defendant's detention, but with
events occurring during the detention. 3
In Royer, government agents stopped the defendant in an
airport, seized his luggage, and took him to a small room used
for questioning, where a search of the luggage revealed narcotics. The Court held that the defendant's detention consti3
The pertinent facts relied on by the Court in Dunaway were that (1)
the defendant was taken from a private dwelling; (2) he was transported
unwillingly to the police station; (3) he there was subjected to custodial interrogation resulting in a confession; and (4) the questioning concerned a
crime known to have had occurred five months earlier, whereas a Terry
stop typically involves suspected criminal activity that is imminent or ongoing or haf!_ just occurred.
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tuted an arrest. See-- U. S., at-- [103 S. Ct., at 1327]
(plurality opinion); id., at - - [1330] (POWELL, J., concurring); id., at-- [1330] (BRENNAN, J., concurring in theresult). As in Dunaway, though, the focus was primarily on
facts other than the duration of the defendant's detentionparticularly the fact that the police confined the defendant in
a small airport room for questioning.
The plurality in Royer did note that "an investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop." - - U. S., at
- - [103 S. Ct., at 1325]. The Court followed a similar approach in Place. In that case, law enforcement agents
stopped the defendant after his arrival in an airport and
seized his luggage for 90 minutes to take it to a narcotics detection dog for a "sniff test." We decided that an investigative seizure of personal property could be justified under the
Terry doctrine, but that "[t]he length of the detention of respondent's luggage alone precludes the conclusion that the
seizure was reasonable in the absence of probable cause."
- - U. S., at - -/ [103 S. Ct., at 2645]. However, the rationale underlying that conclusion was premised on the fact
that the police knew of respondent's arrival time for several
hours beforehand, and the Court assumed that the police
could have arranged for a trained narcotics dog in advance
and thus avoided the necessity of holding respondent's luggage for 90 minutes. "[I]n assessing the effect of the length
of the detention, we take into account whether the police diligently pursue their investigation." Ibid.; see also Royer,
U. S., a t - [103 S. Ct., at 1325].
Here, the Court of Appeals did not conclude that the police
acted less than diligently, or that they unnecessarily prolonged Savage's detention. Place and Royer thus provide no
support for the Court of Appeals' analysis.
Admittedly, Terry, Dunaway, Royer, and Place, considered together, may in some instances create difficult linedrawing problems in distinguishing an investigative stop

83-529---0PINION
10

UNITED STATES v. SHARPE

from a de facto arrest. Obviously, if an investigative stop
continues indefinitely, at some point it can no longer be justified as an investigative stop. But our cases impose no rigid
time limitation on Terry stops. While it is clear that "the
brevity of the invasion of the individual's Fourth Amendment
interests is an important factor in determining whether the
seizure is so minimally intrusive as to be justifiable on reasonable suspicion," United States v. Place, - - U. S., at
- - [103 S. Ct., at 2645], we have emphasized the need to
consider the law enforcement purposes to be served by the
stop as well as the time reasonably needed to effectuate those
purposes. !d., at-- [2642-2643, 2645]; Michigan v. Summers, 452 U. S. 692, 700, and n. 12 (1981) (quoting 3 W.
LaFave, Search and Seizure § 9.2, at 36-37 (1978)). Much as
a "bright line" rule would be desirable, in evaluating whether
an investigative detention is unreasonable, common sense
and ordinary human experience must govern over rigid
criteria.
We sought to make this clear in Michigan v. Summers,
supra:
"If the purpose underlying a Terry sto_Ir-investigating
possible criminal activity-is to be served, the police
must under certain circumstances be able to detain the
individual for longer than the brief time period involved
in Terry and Adams [v. Williams, 407 U. S. 143
(1972)]." 452 U. S., at 700, n. 12.

Later, in Place, we expressly rejected the suggestion that
we adopt a hard-and-fast time limit for a permissible Terry
stop:
"We understand the desirability of providing law enforcement authorities with a clear rule to guide their
conduct. Nevertheless, we question the wisdom of a
rigid time limitation. Such a limit would undermine the
equally important need to allow authorities to graduate
their responses to the demands of any particular situa-
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tion." - - U. S., at--, n. 10 [103 S. Ct., at 2646,
n. 10].
The Court of Appeals' decision would effectively establish a
per se rule that a 20-minute detention is too long to be justified under the Terry doctrine. Such a result is clearly and
fundamentally at odds with our approach in this area.
B

In assessing whether a detention is too long in duration to
be justified as an investigative stop, we consider it appropriate to examine whether the police diligently pursued a means
of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain
the defendant. See Michigan v. Summers, 452 U. S., at
701, n. 14 (quoting 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 9.2, at
40 (1978)); see also Place, U. S., a t - [103 S.Ct, at
2645]; Royer,- U. S., a t -. [103 ~· Ct., at 1325].
Agent Cooke diligently pursued his investigation. During
most of Savage's 20-minute detention, Cooke was attempting
to contact Thrasher and enlisting the help of the local police
who remained with Sharpe while Cooke left to pursue Officer
Thrasher and the pickup. Once Cooke reached Officer
Thrasher and Savage, he proceeded expeditiously: within the
space of a few minutes, he examined Savage's driver's license
and the truck's bill of sale, requested (and was denied) permission to search the truck, stepped on the rear bumper and
noted that the truck did not move, confirming his suspicion
that it was probably overloaded. He then detected the odor
of marijuana.
Clearly this case does not involve any delay unnecessary to
the legitimate investigation of the law enforcement officers.
Respondents presented no evidence that the officers were
dilatory in their investigation. The delay in this case was
attributable almost entirely to the evasive actions of Savage,
who sought to elude the police as Sharpe moved his Pontiac
to the side of the road. Except for Savage's maneuvers,

.
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only a short and certainly permissible pre-arrest detention
would likely have taken place. The somewhat longer detention was simply the result of a "graduate[d) ... response[] to
the demands of [the] particular situation," Place,-- U. S.
at - , n. 10 [103 S. Ct., at 2646, n. 10].
We reject the contention that a 20-minute stop is unreasonable when the police have acted diligently and a suspect's actions contribute to the added delay about which he complains.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is ·reversed, and the
case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
Reversed.
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